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Otte: Determining Whether the EPA Has Proper Authority

DETERMINING WHETHER THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY HAS PROPER AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 111(D)
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO ENFORCE PRESIDENT OBAMA’S
CLEAN ENERGY PLAN
Stephen J. Otte *

I. INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 2015, President Obama announced his administration’s
Clean Energy Plan (Plan), a bold initiative to reduce significantly
carbon-dioxide emissions under the direction of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). 1 Describing the Plan as “the single most
important step America has ever taken in the fight against global climate
change,” the President emphasized that the regulations concern not only
future, but present health, safety, and environmental concerns. 2
Broadly speaking, the Plan calls for nationwide reductions in carbondioxide emissions by 2030, mandating a thirty-two percent decrease in
carbon dioxide relative to 2005 emissions. 3 Pursuant to its apparent
authority under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA has
proposed certain emission standards concerning carbon dioxide released
from existing sources of fossil-fueled power plants. 4 As currently
proposed, the Plan will take the form of state-specific regulations
commensurate with each state’s potential to deploy cost-effective
emission reductions. 5
The EPA identified three distinct measures necessary to achieve this
goal: (1) reduce heat rate among coal-fired power plants; (2) decrease
steam-generating power plants in exchange for natural-gas plants; and
(3) develop zero-emission renewable sources of energy in place of fossil
fuels. 6 The EPA will deem a state to be in compliance with the Plan if it
has achieved the desired ratio of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of
energy. 7
Although the Plan calls for mandatory emission reductions, it
* Associate Member, 2015-2016 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed July 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean Power Act
(Aug. 3, 2015).
3. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,832.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 34,834.
6. Id. at 34,834–35.
7. Id. at 34,834.
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provides states considerable flexibility in forming the method to achieve
compliance. 8 For instance, the states are encouraged to develop their
own compliance strategies that are proportionate with their economic
9
and energy-producing needs. Additionally, states were not required to
submit these compliance plans until June 2016. 10 In some cases, they
may even apply for a three-year extension to submit their plans. 11
Despite these measures, the Plan sparked intense resistance and
increased litigation, especially among leaders in coal-producing states.
For instance, in In Re Murray Energy Corp., the petitioners, company
officials for the Murray Energy Corporation, requested an extraordinary
writ of stay on behalf of the corporation in order to bar the effectuation
of the Plan. 12 In their petition, they argued, inter alia, that the EPA does
not have the authority to promulgate such sweeping regulations. 13 The
petitioners contested that the 1990 House amendments to section 111(d)
of the Clean Air Act explicitly preclude the EPA from regulating
stationary carbon-dioxide sources. 14 They also claimed that the Plan
contradicts the Clean Air Act’s plain language. 15 Finally, the petitioners
argued that the 1990 Senate amendment to section 111(d) has no legal
16
effect because it is a mere “conforming amendment.”
Despite this resistance, President Obama has remained undeterred and
has directed the EPA to employ expeditiously its section 111(d)
authority to enforce the Plan. Whether the EPA actually has such
authority, however, will certainly face continued legal challenges.
Although the D.C. Circuit ultimately denied the petitioner’s emergency
writ in Murray, it is quite certain that the same substantive issues will be
challenged once the Plan is officially recorded in the Federal Register,
possibly requiring a ruling from the Supreme Court. Therefore,
reference to “opponents” throughout this review will refer not only to
the petitioners in Murray, but also to future challengers of the Plan as
well.
This comment discusses whether the EPA has the authority under
section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act to enforce the Clean Energy Plan.
Part II provides the statutory framework of the Clean Air Act as well as
8. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,834.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 34,838.
11. Id. at 34,833.
12. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
13. Petition for Extraordinary Writ, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C Circuit 2015)
(No. 14-1112).
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 19.
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the 1990 amendments to section 111(d). Part III provides a detailed
analysis discussing why section 111(d) affords the EPA with the proper
scope and authority to enforce the Plan. Finally, Part IV concludes the
arguments in favor of the EPA’s interpretation of section 111(d), which
maintains that the EPA indeed has the authority to enforce Obama’s
Clean Energy Plan.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND SECTION 111(D)
In 1970, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act to establish a
collaborative federal and state program for air pollution control. 17 The
Act provides the EPA with the authority to regulate three categories of
air pollutants: (1) criteria pollutants, (2) hazardous air pollutants, and (3)
pollutants that qualify as neither criteria nor hazardous air pollutants. 18
The latter category is governed by section 111(d) of the Act, which
authorizes the EPA to mandate specific “standards of performance”
concerning both existing and new sources of air pollution. 19
Prior to 1990, section 111(d) authorized the EPA to regulate “any
existing source for any air pollutant not included on the list published in
section 108(a) (criteria pollutants) or section 112(b)(1)(a) (hazardous air
pollutants).” 20 In 1990, however, Congress amended the Clean Air Act
to control more effectively hazardous air pollutants under section 112.21
In doing so, Congress identified 189 hazardous air pollutants, and
required the EPA to list all source categories that emit those
pollutants. 22 Congress also mandated that the EPA issue subsequent
emission standards for each pollutant pursuant to section 112(b). 23
When amending section 112, Congress deleted subsection
112(b)(1)(a), a provision that had previously given the EPA general
authority to list hazardous air pollutants which was cross referenced in
section 111(d). 24 To account for this change, both houses of Congress
subsequently passed amendments to section 111(d). The House of
Representatives eliminated “112(b)(1)(a)” and replaced it with the
phrase: “or emitted from a source category which is regulated under
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
18. See id.
19. State Plans for the Control of Certain Pollutants From Existing Facilities, 40 Fed. Reg.
53,340 (Nov. 17, 1975).
20. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1684 (1970).
21. Robert R. Nordhaus & Avi Zevin, Historical Perspectives on § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act,
44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11095, 11098 (2014).
22. Id. at 11096.
23. Id. at 11096.
24. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (Nov. 15,
1990).
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section 112.” 25 Unlike the House amendment, the Senate amendment
did not disturb the pre-1990 section 112 exclusion. Rather, it allowed
section 111(d) to function alongside section 112 as a gap-filling
provision for sources that did not qualify as hazardous air pollutants. 26
In order to harmonize the pre-1990 section 112 exclusion with the
language of the 1990 amendments, the Senate passed a conforming
amendment to section 111(d). 27 Like the House amendment, the
Senate’s amendment eliminated “112(b)(1)(a)” and replaced it with the
phrase “112(b).” 28 However, neither the House nor Senate amendments
to section 111(d) were discussed in floor debates or in conference
committees. 29 The Conference Committee simply adopted the House
amendment without discussion. 30 Although this should have rendered
the Senate language moot, the Conference Committee failed to remove
the Senate’s conforming amendment. 31 Both the House and Senate
amendments were therefore included in the final bill signed by President
Bush. 32 Consequently, the statutes at large contained both the
substantive amendment of the House and the conforming amendment
of the Senate. 33 Thus, as of June 2016, the Amendment now
provides that section 111(d) authorizes the EPA to mandate state-bystate emission standards for existing sources from a source category
that is regulated under section 112. 34
III. DISCUSSION
A. Outline of the Issues in Dispute
Opponents contest that the 1990 House amendment fundamentally
alters the role of section 111(d) because it limits the scope of EPA
regulation. For instance, before the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act, section 111(d) could not be applied to hazardous air pollutants
regulated under section 112. 35 Yet, after the 1990 House amendment,
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21.
28. Section 112(b) was limited to just the list of hazardous air pollutants specifically designated
by Congress. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2574
(Nov. 15, 1990).
29. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21, at 11103.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 11101.
32. Id. at 11102.
33. Id. at 11098.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
35. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1684 (1970).
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this exclusion could be interpreted to exclude both source categories as
well as specific pollutants that fell under the umbrella of section 112. 36
The petitioners in Murray argued just that; specifically, that the
House amendment bars the EPA from regulating any carbon-dioxideemitting sources because such sources are already subject to
regulation under section 112. 37 Under this interpretation, section
111(d) cannot be utilized to regulate carbon dioxide because it would
impermissibly allow for double regulation under sections 111 and
112.
However, this interpretation depends upon several erroneous
assumptions. For instance, opponents of the Plan assume that the
1990 Senate Amendment to the Clean Air Act has no legal
significance because it is not contained in the U.S. Code and is thus a
mere drafting error. 38 Furthermore, they also assume that Congress
implicitly repealed the EPA’s authority to regulate an entire source of
air pollutants via the 1990 House amendment language. 39 As
discussed below, these assumptions are contrary to not only the
legislative history, purpose, and structure of the Clean Air Act, but
they also require the contradiction of various canons of statutory
construction.
B. Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Supports the EPA’s
Interpretation of Section 111(d)

When Congress initially enacted the Clean Air Act, section 111(d)
was included as a catchall provision for dangerous air pollutants not
40
subject to regulation under either section 108 or section 112.
Section 111(d)’s primary function, therefore, was to ensure that there
would be no gaps in the Act’s treatment of dangerous air pollutants. 41
Although the 1990 amendments allowed pollutant-specific carve outs
in order to prevent duplicative regulation, it was clear that these
changes would not displace section 111(d)’s historical function as a
gap filler within the statute. 42 For instance, even following the 1990
amendments, the EPA continued to utilize section 111(d) pursuant to
its historic function. 43
36. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21, at 11101.
37. Petition for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 13, at 6.
38. Id. at 20.
39. Id. at 15–17.
40. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21, at 11097.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 11100.
43. Id. at 11102; Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous
Air Pollutants, 70 Fed. Reg. 15994, 16031-32 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt.63).
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Although some litigants have recently argued that the 1990
amendments eliminated 111(d)’s gap-filling role, this interpretation is
extraordinary. Eviscerating section 111(d)’s gap-filling role through
the passage of the 1990 amendments “would have been extraordinary
for Congress to [do] . . . without any mention of [its] possible
effect.” 44 Even if Congress did intend for such a departure, one
would expect that it would have been mentioned somewhere in the
legislative history. 45 It was not. Instead, the legislative history
suggests that Congress desired to expand, rather than diminish, the
EPA’s authority to regulate dangerous air pollutants. 46 Hence,
reading the House language as a bar against regulation of any source
category governed by section 112 does not make sense in the context
of the rule’s legislative history.
C. The Structure and Purpose of the Clean Air Act Favors the EPA’s
Interpretation of Section 111(d)

As previously mentioned, challengers to the Plan argue that the
EPA must be barred from regulating existing sources of carbon
dioxide under section 111(d) because it would create “double
regulation” in conjunction with section 112. However, this policy, if
implemented, would constrict the intended structure and purpose of
the Clean Air Act; stationary sources, such as those that emit carbon
dioxide, were never intended to be regulated by just one section of
the Act. 47 Rather, the inherent, overriding principle inherent of the
Clean Air Act is that its provisions should be interpreted liberally to
maximize public health and safety. 48
Case law supports this interpretation of how the Clean Air Act should
be construed. In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
Connecticut and other states sought the recognition of a federal cause of
action for environmental harms caused by states through the actions of
owners of existing coal-fired power plants. 49 The defendants insisted
that such a remedy was not available because the Clean Air Act
conferred authority to the EPA to control such emissions under section

44. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176 (1993).
45. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990).
46. Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air
Pollutants, 70 Fed. Reg. at 16,032 (“Such a reading would be inconsistent with the general thrust of the
1990 amendments, which, on balance, reflect Congress’ desire to require EPA to regulate more
substances, not to eliminate EPA’s ability to regulate large categories of pollutants like non-HAP.”)
47. See generally Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21.
48. Id. at 11096.
49. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
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50

111(d). They argued that section 111(d) allows for a comprehensive
regulatory scheme that empowers the EPA to avert the harms caused by
carbon dioxide via the enforcement of section 111(d). 51
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court agreed
with the defendants, holding that section 111(d) does indeed “‘speak[ ]
directly’ to emissions of carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants.”52
The Court further held that the “EPA may not employ [section 111(d)] if
existing stationary sources of the pollutant in question are regulated
under the [criteria] or [hazardous air pollutant] program.” 53 Thus, the
relevant question exacted from American Electric is whether an existing
source is regulated with respect to the specific pollutant in question or if
it is regulated as an entire source. 54 If a pollutant is not deemed either a
criteria pollutant under section 108 or a hazardous air pollutant under
section 112, then section 111(d) commands authority. 55
Opponents’ interpretation, however, would create an anomaly in
the statute because it renders the EPA powerless to regulate any
sources of carbon dioxide if it is even remotely regulated under
section 108 or 112; such an interpretation would entirely bar the EPA
from effectuating any plan to control carbon dioxide for the general
health or welfare of the public at large. Because section 111(d) is
written to create an affirmative obligation for the EPA to address
non-criteria or hazardous air pollutants, this interpretation would strip
the EPA of its ability to meet its statutory obligation.
Therefore, in light of both historical perspectives and case law,
opponents’ interpretation clearly fails to capture the purpose and
function of section 111(d). Instead, it merely “impute[s] to Congress
a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with
the other.” 56
D. The Senate Amendment to Section 111(d) Conforms to the Structure,
Design, and Purpose of Section 111(d)
The Senate Amendment unambiguously allows the EPA to utilize
section 111(d) for the regulation of harmful pollutants not formally
categorized as either criteria or hazardous pollutants. 57 For instance,
50. Id. at 419.
51. Id. at 424–28.
52. Id. at 424.
53. Id. at 424 n.7.
54. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 n.7.
55. Id.
56. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan., 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (quoting Weinberger v.
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631 (1973)).
57. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21, at 11096.
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section 112(n), in referring to section 111(d) provides: “No emission
standard or other requirement promulgated under this section shall be
interpreted, construed or applied to diminish or replace the requirements
of a more stringent emission limitation or other applicable requirement
established pursuant to section 111.” 58 Accordingly, the scope of
section 111(d) was intended to remain inclusive; any other reading
would create inconsistencies among the other subsections of the Clean
Air Act, including section 112.
Clearly, then, section 112 was not intended to disrupt section 111(d)’s
structure or purpose. Despite this, challengers of the Plan cite section
112 as evidence that Congress intended to preclude overlap between
section 111(d) and section 112. 59 Yet, this argument fails because
section 112 does not support the notion that Congress was forcing the
EPA to choose which provision would supersede the other. Rather,
section 112(n) merely eliminates double regulation of a specific type,
not the specific source of air pollutants. 60
The structure, history, or purpose of the Clean Air Act therefore does
not support Arguments that the Senate’s amendment provides an
exception to the statutory scheme of section 111(d). Section 111(d)
clearly allows for double regulation of the same source, but not
necessarily the same type of air pollutant. Thus, in the present case, this
means that the EPA may regulate the same source of carbon dioxide
under more than one provision of the Clean Air Act, which would
logically include section 111(d). This point is critical because
opponents’ entire theory relies on the premise that all sources of carbon
dioxide, if subject to regulation via section 112 or section 108, may not
be subject to 111(d)’s regulation, as to avoid duplicative regulation.
E. The Senate’s “Conforming Amendment” Label Does Not Abrogate Its
Legal Authority
As discussed above, the Senate Amendment reflects congressional
intent to exempt pollutants that are regulated simultaneously by section
112, but does not exempt sources from dual regulation under section
111(d). Challengers to the rule contest that, even if the Senate language
evinces this plain meaning, it is nonetheless null and void because the
Senate Amendment is not legally binding.
Opponents challenge the legitimacy of the Senate Amendment
because it is labeled as a “conforming amendment.” 61 Although
58.
59.
60.
61.

42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(7) (2012).
Petition for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 13, at 8.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
Petition for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 13, at 19–20.
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opponents may argue that the Senate’s label renders the law
nonsubstantive, case law suggests otherwise. 62 For instance, the United
States Supreme Court has held that “the [heading of a section] cannot
limit the plain meaning of the text.” 63 The Court has also articulated
that a label cannot strip conforming amendments of their substance; 64 a
statute is a statute regardless of the label. 65 Tradition dictates that
conforming amendments should only be deemed nonsubstantive when
Congress clearly did not intend to make major changes to a given
statutory scheme. 66
In the present case, there is no evidence that the Senate’s conforming
Amendment was intended to render major changes to the Clean Air Act.
On the contrary, the Senate language largely preserves the pre-1990
gap-filler role of section 111(d). 67 Therefore, reviewing courts must
give effect to every word used in the Senate Amendment when
interpreting the meaning of section 111(d) as a whole. 68
F. The Senate Amendment to Section 111(d) Has Legal Effect Because It
Is Contained in the Statues at Large

Critics to the Plan also contest that the plain meaning of the Senate
Amendment is moot because the Senate Amendment is not contained
in the U.S. Code. This argument also fails because, although it may
not have been transcribed in the U.S. Code, both the House’s
substantive Amendment and the Senate’s conforming Amendments
are contained in the statutes at large. 69 Congress must approve and
the President must sign statutes at large, so they constitute the “legal
evidence of laws” and are therefore the official law. 70
The U.S. Code, on the other hand, is considered “non-positive
law” that may only “establish prima facie the laws of the United
States.” 71 Because the U.S. Code is merely prima facie, it cannot, by
definition, prevail over the statutes at large in the event that the two
are in conflict. 72 The U.S. Code can trump statutes at large only if

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008).
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)).
Id.
United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 n.5 (1992).
Dir. of Revenue v. CoBank ACB, 531 U.S. 316, 323 (2001).
S. REP. NO. 91-1196 (1970).
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21.
1 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012).
Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943).
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Congress were to approve the title as being positive law. 73
In the present matter, the Code’s omission of the Senate
Amendment in section 111(d) does not abrogate the Amendment’s
legal significance because the statutes at large override U.S. Code. 74
Furthermore, Congress has never approved Title 42 of the U.S. Code,
so the omission of the Senate Amendment to section 111(d) in the
U.S. Code has no legal effect. Again, this provides evidence that any
interpretation of the meaning of section 111(d) must consider the
language contained in both the House and Senate Amendments.
G. The House Amendment Does Not Provide Support For An Inclusive
Source Exemption From Section 111(d)

Challengers to the Plan believe that the House Amendment
stripped the EPA of any authority to regulate stationary sources of
carbon dioxide under section 111(d). 75 However, this reading is
suspect because it would not only cripple section 111(d)’s longstanding role as a catchall provision for those sources, but would also
represent an unambiguous departure from the most reasonable
understanding of the House Amendment’s language. 76 One example
of this is how the phrase “regulated under section 112” should be
interpreted. While opponents may recognize the word “regulated” in
the House Amendment as a blanket exemption to all source
categories, the term could also be interpreted to favor the EPA’s
understanding of section 111(d). 77 For instance, “regulated under
section 112” could also be read to mean “with respect to that same
pollutant.” Under that interpretation, the House Amendment bolsters
the EPA’s conclusion that section 111(d) provides authority to
regulate the same sources of pollution, even if those sources are
concurrently regulated under section 108 or 112.
In any event, the EPA’s interpretation should prevail. The
Supreme Court has held, for instance that “[the term ‘regulated’]
require[s] interpretation, for [its] meaning is not ‘plain.’” 78 Yet, a
contextual reading of the House language indicates that section
111(d) modifies the phrase “any air pollutant” but not the phrase
“any existing source.” Based on this syntax, the most logical
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993).
See id.
Petition for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 13, at 8.
See generally Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (Nov. 15,

1990).
78. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 363 (1999).
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inference is that the House Amendment is actually consistent with the
historical function of section 111(d): it exempts certain air pollutants,
but not their sources, from simultaneous regulation with section 112.
Clearly, opponents’ interpretation of section 111(d) is suspect even
when the language of the House Amendment is read in isolation.
Yet, such ambiguity diminishes when reading the House Amendment
within the specific context of the Act as a whole. For instance,
reading the House Amendment in consideration of the cross
reference to section 112, makes clear that its language must allow for
greater, not diminished, coverage of air pollutants. Section 112
explicitly requires the “maximum degree of reduction in emissions of
the hazardous air pollutants [to be] subject to this section.”79
Therefore, logic dictates that section 111(d) must function alongside
section 112 as a gap-filling provision.
In sum, even when read out of context, there is sufficient
ambiguity in the House Amendment’s language to conclude that it
does not bar the EPA from utilizing section 111(d) to enforce the
Clean Energy Plan. There is even less ambiguity, however, when the
amendment is read in context with section 112 as well as the rest of
the statute. In such context, it is clear that the term “regulated” most
likely means that the same sources, but not necessarily the same
pollutants, are to be regulated concurrently with section 112 or
section 108.
H. Chevron Will Apply to This Dispute
When determining whether a regulatory agency’s construction of a
statute should be entitled to deference, the courts often employ a twostep inquiry. 80 In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court held that
the term “stationary source” of the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1977
constituted all pollution-emitting devices contained within the same
industrial grouping, or “bubble.” 81 The Court reasoned that this was a
proper construction of the ambiguous term because it was based on a
“permissible construction of the statute.” 82
Hence, under the Chevron framework, a court must consider whether
Congress has directly and unambiguously spoken to a precise question
at issue. 83 If it has, the regulatory agency must adhere to that clear
meaning. However, if Congress was silent or ambiguous, the second
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

42 U.S.C § 7412(d)(2) (2012).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 843, 845.
Id. at 842–43.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 9

312

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85

question to determine is whether “the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” 84 If a court deems the
regulatory agency’s answer a permissible construction, the court will
likely give deference to the agency’s interpretation. 85
Courts applying the Chevron framework need not determine the
“plain meaning” of a statute. Instead, the reviewing court must only
determine if the regulatory agency promulgated a reasonable
interpretation. 86 Accordingly, the Chevron doctrine entrusts the expert
agency with the benefit of the doubt in statutory interpretation because
any given agency has “a full understanding of the force of the statutory
policy.” 87
The Chevron Court held that it is “entirely appropriate” for regulatory
agencies “to make such policy judgments
—resolving
the
competing interests which Congress either inadvertently did not resolve,
or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.” 88 This
holding presumptively favors regulatory agencies’ interpretations of the
statutes they enforce. For instance, as Chevron makes explicitly clear,
regulatory agencies, not the judiciary, should resolve issue of
interpretation in their first pass. 89 Therefore, in order to overcome such
deference to a given agency, challengers must prove that the regulatory
agency rendered an unreasonable interpretation.
It is apparent that Chevron would apply in this case. Whether
intentional or by accident, the amendments to section 111(d), by both
the House and Senate, created an ambiguity in the statute’s meaning.
Therefore, the EPA, “charged with the administration of the statute,”
should be entitled to resolve that ambiguity through its own reasonable
interpretation of section 111(d). 90 Although the Supreme Court has
never addressed whether ambiguity created by a legislative anomaly
warrants a Chevron analysis, the Court has rejected analogous attempts
to avert the Chevron rule. For instance, in Scialabba v. De Osorio, the
Court held that Chevron still applies even if the ambiguity has resulted
from conflicting statutory language. 91 Likewise, the Court has also
ruled that, when statutory construction deals with the proper scope of a

84. Id.
85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
86. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 219 (2008).
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.
88. Id. at 865–66 (noting that “[j]udges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See generally Scialabba v. De Osorio., 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
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regulatory agency, Chevron remains equally applicable. 92
In the present matter, opponents argue that the statutory text of the
House Amendment evinces plain meaning; thus, Chevron cannot
apply. 93 Moreover, opponents assert that, even if there were sufficient
ambiguity in the statutory language, Chevron would still not be an
appropriate framework because the Senate Amendment constitutes a
mere “drafting error.” 94
This argument is not persuasive, however, because, as previously
demonstrated, the Senate Amendment is not a drafting error. Moreover,
although the nexus of the ambiguity in the statute is unclear, nothing in
the present case undermines the policy justifications outlined in
Chevron. Therefore, the EPA should not be enjoined from proffering its
version of section 111(d) to enforce the provisions of the Plan, as it is
entitled to do under Chevron.
I. Canons of Statutory Construction Favor the EPA

Opponents of the rule would prefer to interpret the House
Amendment’s reference to a “source category” as a blanket exception
for all stationary sources under section 111(d). 95 However, this
interpretive methodology is contrary to traditional canons of statutory
construction. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that
“[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of
statutory context.” 96 Moreover, “[t]he literal language of a provision
taken out of context cannot provide conclusive proof of
congressional intent.” 97 Thus, courts must “employ all the tools of
statutory interpretation, including ‘. . . structure [and] purpose.’” 98
Opponents to the Plan, however, do not consider context. Instead,
they assume that the Senate Amendment simply lacks legal effect,
and that the 1990 House Amendment language eviscerated the EPA’s
long-standing authority to regulate an entire source of air pollutants
99
under section 111(d).
Opponents to the Plan also argue that the Plan violates the canon
of construction against the implied repeal of prior law. 100 Only when
92. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1871–73 (2013).
93. See Petition for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 13, at 8.
94. See id.
95. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
96. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
97. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
98. Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of
Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
99. Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d at 334.
100. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976).
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Congressional intent to override an earlier provision is “clear and
manifest” will the courts rescind valid law. 101 Here, the record is far
from being “clear and manifest;” rather, it is void of Congressional
intent to eliminate the pre-1990 scope of section 111(d). For
instance, no mention of such intent was apparent in committee
reports, floor debates, or conference reports for the 1990
amendments. 102 Instead, the House Amendment was introduced with
language that would have expanded section 111(d) coverage to
include hazardous air pollutants where the EPA had discretion not to
regulate a source under section 112. 103
Opponents also interpret the House and Senate Amendments to be
in irreconcilable conflict. Because of such conflict, they argue that
the language of the House Amendment should prevail. 104 However,
the courts have held that there needs to be “a positive repugnancy
between” two provisions or a clear indication “that they cannot
mutually coexist.” 105 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that
if “two statutory provisions are fundamentally at odds, constitutional
doubt will have to serve as the best guide to breaking the tie.” 106
Therefore, even if there is conflict between the statutes, it absolutely
can be resolved.
Proving irreconcilable conflict is unlikely here. For instance, after
viewing the two amendments in light of the legislative history of the
1990 amendments to section 111(d), it is clear that there is not a
“positive repugnancy” between the House and Senate versions. Even
if there were an irreconcilable conflict, the Senate version would
control because the D.C. Circuit Court has applied the last-in-order
rule which gives legal vitality to the most recently enacted provision
of a law. 107
Finally, assuming that opponents do not bring a Chevron argument,
the courts themselves are entitled to give meaning to conflicting
provisions in a statute unless there is a clearly expressed Congressional
intention to the contrary. 108 Historically, courts have employed this
canon of construction in similar cases involving interpretive disputes of
the Clean Air Act.109 In Spencer County v. EPA, for instance, the D.C.
101. See id. at 154 (quoting Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 262 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
102. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21, at 11103.
103. Id. at 11102.
104. Petition for Extraordinary Writ, supra note 13, at 19.
105. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155.
106. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 509 (1999).
107. See Edward v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
108. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974).
109. See Citizens to Save Spencer Cty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See
generally Atwell v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 670 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Circuit reviewed a conflict resulting from section 165 of the 1977 Clean
Air Act, which purportedly prohibited the construction of stationary
sources without adherence to new permitted requirements subject to
state approval. 110 In Spencer County, as is the case here, both the House
and Senate Amendments to section 165 were “conceived in separate
Houses and . . . never reconciled when the Act as a whole was given
birth in Conference.” 111 Although the specific requirements of the Act
were unclear, the court found that neither amendment expressed
intention to bar completely the eventual implementations; hence, the
court approved the EPA’s implementation plan in the face of conflicting
amendments and held that “it was the greater wisdom for the agency. . .
to give maximum possible effect to both.” 112
Analogous to Spencer County, the 1990 amendments regarding
section 111(d) also originated in different chambers. However, they
nonetheless achieve the same purpose of ensuring that the EPA will
prescribe regulations pursuant to section 111(d)’s purpose. Thus, the
House and Senate Amendments to section 111(d) must be read together,
ensuring maximum effect to each.
Opponents’ interpretation of section 111(d) should be defeated
because it is incompatible with the canons of statutory construction.
First, it violates the canon against prior repeal of law. Second,
opponents’ interpretation of 111(d) fails to consider both the context and
the history of the Clean Air Act, the language of the Senate’s
Amendment to section 111(d), and the overall structure and purpose of
said provision. Third, because the Senate Amendment was drafted
following the construction of the House Amendment, the last-in-order
rule would give deference to the Senate Amendment, even if it were
found to be in irreconcilable conflict with the House language. Finally,
all things considered, the courts will likely give maximum effect to both
the House and the Senate Amendments, thereby preserving the
previously held function of section 111(d).
Thus, the most logical interpretation of section 111(d) is one that
enables the EPA to utilize this provision to enforce the Plan. Any
interpretation that would impair this function not only deprives
maximum effect to the House and Senate provisions but also is
unreasonably contrary to the history and purpose of the Clean Air Act
itself.

110. Spencer Cty., 600 F.2d at 870.
111. Id. at 866.
112. Id. at 872.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since 1970, section 111(d) has been an integral part of the Clean Air
Act, functioning as a catchall for air pollutants not regulated elsewhere
in the Act. 113 However, opponents to the Act have contested, and likely
will contest, that the breadth of its regulations exceeds the scope of
section 111(d). 114 In particular, they assert that the 1990 House
amendment to the Clean Air Act crippled this provision’s originally held
purpose. 115 As such, challengers argue that the EPA lacks authority to
initiate such sweeping reductions in carbon-dioxide emissions.
As demonstrated, this interpretation fails on several grounds.
First, the legislative structure, design, and purpose of the Clean Air
Act, which establishes that section 111(d) has historically functioned
as a gap-filling provision to regulate sources of pollutants not
controlled for under sections 108 or 112 of the Act, contradicts this
interpretation. 116 Second, there is no plain-meaning interpretation
or textual evidence that either the 1990 House or Senate amendments
were drafted with the intent to strip section 111(d) of its previously
held gap-filling role. Even assuming there is insufficient ambiguity
in the statute to draw this conclusion, Chevron dictates that the
EPA’s interpretation of section 111(d) should nonetheless be given
deference. Lastly, opponents’ interpretation directly contradicts the
canons of statutory construction. 117
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, threating
“some of the most fundamental determinants of health: food, air, and
water.” 118 Despite its gravity, this important issue is still fundamentally
viewed as political or partisan. In a sense, “it has been turned into a
political football primarily by the climate deniers who have a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo.” 119 Although the EPA’s Plan will
require fundamental changes in our country’s energy-producing
infrastructure, the Plan represents a viable step in solving the evergrowing environmental catastrophe that potentially awaits. For all these
reasons, the EPA’s interpretation of section 111(d) should prevail when

113. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21, at 11096.
114. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 334 (D.C. Circuit 2015).
115. Id.
116. Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 21, at 11100.
117. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46:5 (7th ed. 2007); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974); Edward v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055,
1080 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
118. CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], Doc. EB122/4
(Jan. 16, 2008).
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it comes under attack over the coming months and years.
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